Hva IS virkelig ønsker

ikke gi krefter vi ikke ønsker vokse fram i samfunnet oppmerksomhet, da det kan føre til uønsket vekst - istedenfor aktiv avstandstagen.

Jeg mener at vi er over det nivå nå.  Vi lever i en hverdag der vi alle kan bli en aktiv del av et drama vi ikke har gjort mye for å bli en del av - noe av dette er beskrevet tidligere i dette innlegget "Korsfarere i nåtid og islam"

[ http://www.verdidebatt.no/debatt/cat12/subcat15/thread11558914/#post_11558914 ]

Grahame Wood i The Atlantic har skrevet en svært god og informativ artikkel på 10000 ord der han i detalj beskriver den underliggende ideologi og religiøse tenkning bak IS.  Han sier at vi i Vesten ikke har nubbesjans til å bekjempe IS hvis vi ikke setter oss inn i tenkesettet - og der er det en snev av håp, sier Wood - for der hvor Bin Laden var hemmelighetsfull og lite opplysende om hva som vi skje .. next ... , så er IS ganske så informative om hva vi kan forvente oss.

Disse lederene i IS er ikke gale - de tar Muhammed og islam på alvor.  Derfor vil det være umulig å stoppe IS med religiøse argumenter, fordi hele poenget med det som foregår nå er å bringe islam tilbake til det 7ende århundre - tilbake til det Muhammed framviste - og enhver muslim som argumenterer med at Muhammed's metoder ikke funker i dag, vil ha null autoritet i et ISlandskap.

IS har et budskap som det er stor fare for vil appelere til svært mange unge muslimer.  Ved å i handling understreke og peke på at Muhammed var den perfekte profet og det ytterste eksemplet til etterfølgelse for menneskeheten, så vil IS budbære en troskap til Muhammed som ingen andre islamgrener kan konkurrere med.

Et par utdrag:

" The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group's actions. Osama bin Laden was seldom predictable. He ended his first television interview cryptically. CNN's Peter Arnett asked him, "What are your future plans?" Bin Laden replied, "You'll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing." By contrast, the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by listening carefully, we can deduce how it intends to govern and expand.

In London, Choudary and his students provided detailed descriptions of how the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy, now that it is a caliphate. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as "offensive jihad," the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. "Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves," Choudary said; without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph.

Choudary took pains to present the laws of war under which the Islamic State operates as policies of mercy rather than of brutality. He told me the state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies—a holy order to scare the shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.

Choudary's colleague Abu Baraa explained that Islamic law permits only temporary peace treaties, lasting no longer than a decade. Similarly, accepting any border is anathema, as stated by the Prophet and echoed in the Islamic State's propaganda videos. If the caliph consents to a longer-term peace or permanent border, he will be in error. Temporary peace treaties are renewable, but may not be applied to all enemies at once: the caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest, or he will fall into a state of sin."

"It would be facile, even exculpatory, to call the problem of the Islamic State "a problem with Islam." The religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate's practices written plainly within them.

Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate now, and that crucifixion is wrong at this historical juncture. Many say precisely this. But they cannot condemn slavery or crucifixion outright without contradicting the Koran and the example of the Prophet. "The only principled ground that the Islamic State's opponents could take is to say that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid," Bernard Haykel says. That really would be an act of apostasy.

The Islamic State's ideology exerts powerful sway over a certain subset of the population. Life's hypocrisies and inconsistencies vanish in its face. Musa Cerantonio and the Salafis I met in London are unstumpable: no question I posed left them stuttering. They lectured me garrulously and, if one accepts their premises, convincingly. To call them un-Islamic appears, to me, to invite them into an argument that they would win. If they had been froth-spewing maniacs, I might be able to predict that their movement would burn out as the psychopaths detonated themselves or became drone-splats, one by one. But these men spoke with an academic precision that put me in mind of a good graduate seminar. I even enjoyed their company, and that frightened me as much as anything else."

Vi må og ha i mente at når det nå i hver kommune skal settes inn "noe" som skal møte de som står i fare for å bli radikalisert.  Hvis da "noen" ikke har kunnskap hverken om IS eller islam, så blir dette bare ord på et papir som ikke har noen kraft i møte med potensielle i fare for radikalisering.  Denne artikkelen vil være til svært god hjelp.

Og- det er en stor fare i disse som Choudary - vår mann UH - og andre - at det er rimelig trivelig å være i lag med de og de virker farlig opplyste og rede til å svare på det meste - med overbevisning.  Som Wood sa - I enjoyed their company.

[ http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ ]